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An Aljazeera article, published on January 9, 2015, ran the following headline: “Muslims in the news only when they’re behind the gun” 
(Beydoun 2015). This statement is echoed in results of media research in-
dicating that Islam and Islamic actors are often constructed in the Western 
press as a foreign threat or the domestic Other. Already before 9/11, news 
articles in the US media were found to link Islam to fundamentalism and 
terrorism (Awass 1996). In his seminal work on Islam media coverage, 
Edward Said (1997) pointed out the Western media’s almost automatic 
association of Islam with fundamentalism. 
This chapter interrogates whether the flagship publication of the Chi-
nese Communist Party, Renminribao, also portrays Islamist actors as the 
“threatening Other.” Just like antagonistic representations, essentialism, 
and stereotyping have been shown to be communicative mechanisms in 
Western imagery of the Oriental “Other” (Said 1978), similar strategies 
appear to underlie Chinese representations of the Other, be it the foreign 
Other when tensions arise with foreign nations or domestic Other when 
viewed as secessionist or unpatriotic (Lams 2014). Relating to Islam, it ap-
pears both from the literature and from our data that the Other in the Chi-
nese press consists not really of peaceful Islamist actors, but rather of ter-
rorist and fundamentalist groups, primarily from abroad and to a lesser 
extent also internal terrorist actors. The Chinese term “three forces” or 
“sangu shili” (三股势力, often translated into English as “three evils”)—
separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism—was introduced in 2000 
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during meetings of the Shanghai Five, now the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization. It especially refers to external forces that may negatively 
influence the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Of specific 
relevance is the perceived domestic threat of the Uyghur Muslims, less 
because of the religious dimension than because of the ethno-political 
factor. Given the research question whether there is a similar type of 
Othering in the Chinese press to the one spotted in some other media 
systems, this chapter focuses on the depiction of the Uyghur Muslim ac-
tor in China, rather than on other groups of Chinese Muslims in China, 
such as the Hui Muslims. Previous research suggests that negativity in 
mainstream Chinese press narratives is less salient when it concerns these 
other Muslim actors (Alkazemi 2015). 
The public discursive link between Islam and its radical followers has 
fluctuated over the years. In the aftermath of the 2001 Twin Tower at-
tacks, the media in the Middle East, United States, South Asia, and South-
East Asia reflected the essentialist rhetoric of “leaders with worldviews 
blinkered by religion, nationalism and ignorance” (Pintak 2006, 189) and 
were transformed from channels of understanding to tools of violence. 
Gradually, however, the heated rhetoric of the post-9/11 climate sub-
sided and it became commonplace to distinguish the faith of Islam from 
its radicalized followers. Formulations, such as “clash of civilizations” 
(Mathews 1926, Huntington 1993) or “roots of Muslim rage” (Lewis 
1990) as causal explanations for violence were questioned. Yet, since the 
emergence of Islamic State, Islamophobia has resurged. The semantic 
distinction between the faith and its followers who commit violence in 
its name became lost in what has been termed “securitization of Islam” 
(see chapter 1) or the political construction of threat of Islamic radicalism 
(Piscatori 2015). Therefore, a book project like this, probing into the press 
representation of internal/external Islam and Islamic actors across vari-
ous media systems cannot be timelier. 
In view of the renewed Islamophobia, a textual analysis of how Islam 
and its main actors are portrayed in press narratives is relevant to point 
out the danger of discursive mechanisms, such as dichotomizing between 
the evil Other and the benevolent Self. Instances of generalization are 
shown by Akbarzadeh and Smith (2005) when they observe that recurring 
language, used to describe Islam and Muslims, such as “Islamic terrorism” 
or “Muslim fanatics,” can come to be representative of all Muslims and 
Islam as a religion (2005, 4). Other media discursive practices are fram-
ing certain groups and events from a particular perspective and consis-
tently attributing positive/negative properties in descriptions of in- and 
out-groups. According to the results of a 2012 study1 that explored how 
journalists approach the issues of ethnicity and religion in diverse societies 
within the EU, the majority of stories on religious aspects were reports on 
contested matters such as the veil, teaching Islam in schools, integration, 
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places of worship, abortion, Islamophobia, religious extremism, homo-
sexuality, and sexual scandals in the Catholic Church (IFJ 2012, 58). 
An outline of research on Western media language and Islam can be 
found in Baker, Gabrielatos, and McEnery (2013b), listing studies on US, 
British, and Australian news media. As the authors contend, “research 
that has examined the representation of Islam in the western news media 
has generally found evidence for negative bias” (2013b, 257). However, 
Bleich et al. (2015) bring a nuance to the scholarly arguments by dem-
onstrating the relativity of certain results, in that, for example, headlines 
in British right-leaning newspapers are more negative than those in left-
leaning papers. This nuance is echoed by Faimau (2013), who examined 
the discursive representation of Islam and Muslims in the British Chris-
tian news media. With a few exceptions, the Christian media reportedly 
separate the extremists from the rest of Muslims. Terrorists are consid-
ered the hijackers of the Islamic religion, not its representatives. This con-
clusion is consistent with our findings in the current study of the Chinese 
press representation of Islam and its actors.
METHODOLOGY AND THEORY
Much as the present analysis was conducted separately from the team 
exploring Western representation of Islam,2 the research process is com-
parable to that described in the chapters in the second part of the book. 
Similar elements were analyzed, such as salience, news location and oc-
casions, (sub)themes and their religious dimensions, representation of 
actors in terms of their religious background, gender, and collectivity. 
An extra variable, ethnicity, was added because Muslim actors belong to 
various ethnicities and the degree of their integration within the majority 
Han Chinese society appears to distinguish the Uyghur Muslims from 
other Islamist groups in China, such as the Hui. This chapter focuses 
on portrayal of the Muslim actor rather than on Islam as such. The reli-
gious dimension in the Chinese official press stories is limited, given the 
sensitivity of religion in China. As a result of the traditional Confucian 
orthodoxy, the Chinese state has, since ancient times, reserved the right 
to exercise strict control over all forms of religion. The Marxist orthodoxy, 
adhering to the principle that religion is opium for the people, enhanced 
this prerogative to control religious groups. In view of this general state 
attitude to religion, it is not surprising that few articles can be found on 
religion, and even fewer on external or internal Islam. A second difference 
from the team work concerns the hypotheses on (ideological) political 
parallelism among the European press representations of Islam. These 
are not applicable to the Chinese corpus, because the conservative right/
progressive left divide does not hold in the Chinese press.
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Yet another divergence from the content analysis of the team project is 
the qualitative approach to the analysis. Besides mapping salience, which 
informs us on the first-level media agenda setting,3 this study examines 
what type of semantic roles are attributed to which actors. Critical dis-
course analysis was used to trace discursive strategies of positive self- and 
negative other-representation (Van Dijk 2009) and, additionally, to recon-
struct any underlying frames or central organizing themes. Framing is a 
theoretically interesting approach to the study of cognitive processes and 
their effects on media consumers. The theoretical perspectives on fram-
ing can be synthesized under Entman’s formulation of the four functions 
of framing, “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them 
more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote a par-
ticular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/
or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman 1993, 52). 
Rather than investigating the classical generic frames, as put forward by 
Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), specific frames were derived from the 
texts in an inductive way. Frames emerge from textual devices that attri-
bute certain properties to actors and present arguments like justifications, 
causes, and consequences of a certain event in a systematic way. Since 
these framing and reasoning devices (Gamson and Lasch 1983) cumula-
tively lead to a frame package or an overarching perspective of an event 
or of actors, it was decided that at least three framing devices had to be 
identified within a single text for an emerging image about a particular 
actor or situation to be recognized as a frame. Examples of such devices 
can be visual images, word choice, metaphors, or evaluative attributions 
of negative or positive traits for certain actors.
The unit of investigation was the Chinese-language newspaper 人民日
报 (Renminribao, henceforth RMRB). All articles from 2008 and 2009 that 
contained the term “Uyghur” at least three times were retrieved from 
the official RMRB archive website through the search string 维吾尔族 
weiwuerzu.4 The search yielded a corpus of 60 articles, six for 2008 and 54 
for 2009 with an average length of 2,534 characters. In 2008, the Beijing 
Olympics garnered international media exposure and on July 5, 2009, eth-
nic riots erupted in Urumqi, capital of Xinjiang and home to the majority 
of the Uyghur population. 
CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND TO THE NARRATIVES:  
ISLAM AND MUSLIM GROUPS IN CHINA
Muslim Groups in China
While few works have been published on Chinese media representation 
of Islam and local and international Muslim actors, a plethora of works 
 Salience and Representation of Islam and Uyghur Muslims 209
can be found on Islamic groups in China.5 Many of these works discuss 
the contentious relationship between the various groups of Chinese Mus-
lims and the state, their association with the larger Islamic community, 
and issues of ethnicity, culture, and religious identity. In this chapter, we 
limit ourselves to only the most relevant aspects to contextualize the nar-
ratives under investigation and refer to the literature for a more in-depth 
discussion of the relationship between Islamic minority groups in China 
and the dominant Han society. 
No definitive figures can be given on the number of Muslims in China, 
as the official Chinese Census identifies people according to their ethnic 
nationality, but not religious affiliation. Official Chinese doctrine is highly 
uncomfortable with religion. Yet, Islam is one of China’s five officially rec-
ognized religions. Just like the polyphony found in Flanders’ female Mus-
lim identities (Broos and Van den Bulck 2012), Islam is not a monolithic 
bloc in China. The number of Muslims in China was estimated at 22.8 
million in 2008, comprising ten Muslim minority nationalities. Although 
they constitute only 2% of the population, their numbers are impressive 
when compared with other Muslim states. There are more Muslims in 
China than in Malaysia, and more than in every Middle Eastern Muslim 
nation except Iran, Turkey, and Egypt (Gladney 2003). The largest group 
is the Hui, third in rank of the minority nationalities after the Zhuang and 
the Manchu. Their 10.9 million people are dispersed across the country 
and speak the regional language in addition to Han Chinese, Arabic, and 
Persian. The second-largest Muslim community are the Turkic-speaking 
Uyghurs with an estimated 9.5 million people. As the fifth-largest minor-
ity group, they reside in China’s western Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region. The Kazak are ranked the third-largest Muslim group with a 
population of 1.4 million people (Poston, Alnuaimi, and Zhang 2010). 
Where religion is the prime unitary factor for the Hui people, despite 
the regime’s efforts at dissociating religion from their identity,6 it is not 
the only determining factor in the identity construction of the Uyghur 
people in the Northwestern Province of Xinjiang, referred to by many 
Muslims as “East Turkistan” (the former name of Xinjiang, currently a 
taboo word for the Chinese government). Ethnic conflict in that area was 
frequent already during the Republican era but worsened in the face of 
the Communist leadership’s efforts at harmonization of the minorities to 
achieve a unified Chinese nation. Chinese Muslims have been subjected 
to “Hanification” or “Sinification” (Siddiqui and Imtiyaz 2014). This is a 
sociopolitical strategy by the majority Han authorities aiming at the as-
similation of the ethnic and religious minorities by linguistic integration, 
mixed marriages, education in public schools using Mandarin as the main 
language. In 1945 Uyghurs constituted 80% of Xinjiang’s population. To-
day, incentives for Han Chinese to move to the province have reduced 
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the ethnic group to only 43% of Xinjiang population (MacGillivray and 
Harder 2009). Bovingdon (2010) illustrates how the PRC has failed in 
transforming Uyghurs into loyal members of the multiethnic Chinese na-
tion and how Chinese policy has sown profound discontent among the 
Uyghur population. 
The difference between the Hui and Uyghurs in their relationships with 
the Chinese state is neatly detailed in the following excerpt:
While both the Hui and Uyghurs have been equally subjected to social 
biases, ethnic and religious discrimination and government repression, the 
Uyghurs have an, arguably, tenser relation with the Chinese government 
than the Hui. . . . The difference in treatment between Hui and Uyghurs can 
be attributed to a number of factors, the most important being contestation 
over Xinjiang region and a sense of Uyghur independence and autonomy 
relative to the People’s Republic of China. (Shorey 2013)
In between the two groups of the Hui and the Uyghurs, there is a range 
of Muslim nationalities who are either closer to the Uyghurs in resisting 
Chinese culture (Uzbeks, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks) or closer to the Hui 
in accommodating it (Dongxiang and Bonan) (Gladney 2003). 
State–Uyghur Relations
In general, the Uyghurs are more resistant to integration into Chinese 
society than other Muslim groups. They are the only Muslim minority 
group in China that expresses a desire for a separate state, although it 
remains unclear whether or not this sentiment is shared by all Uyghurs 
(Gladney 2003).7 In addition, Uyghurs sense that their region’s resources 
are being expropriated because the mining and export of Xinjiang’s oil 
and gas are carried out by an almost entirely Han workforce and accord-
ing to Beijing’s rules (Bovingdon 2004). Heavy Han immigration and the 
allocation of powerful government and party positions to Han officials, 
as well as the pressure on Uyghurs to assimilate linguistically and cultur-
ally have deepened the cultural divide despite the explicit constitutional 
protections and the laws on autonomy. 
Uyghurs are also often portrayed as united around separatist or Is-
lamist causes, although they are divided between Sufi and non-Sufi, over 
territorial loyalties, linguistic differences, commoner-elite alienation, ur-
ban vs. rural residence, regional loyalties, and attitudes about the public 
role of Islam (Gladney 2003, Bovingdon 2004, Light 2007). The Chinese 
government takes issue with the Uyghurs over their insistence on a dis-
tinct cultural, but especially political identity, which runs counter to the 
ideal of a unified Chinese nation. 
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More importantly, the regime links all Uyghur secessionist activities 
and violence with the most jihadist Uyghur group, the Turkistani Islamic 
Party (TIP), which claims to be the successor to the East Turkistan Islamic 
Movement (ETIM) and, since 2008, has used the global jihadist media to 
present itself as the successor of the classical Islamic caliphate, operating 
parallel to Al-Qaeda. While having ties to the Taliban, it is found to have 
only peripheral links to Al-Qaeda and, unlike other militant Islamist 
groups, it has failed to break into the mainstream Arabic information 
environment. A 2004 study of Xinjiang violence concluded there had not 
been any verifiable activity by ETIM prior to its being labelled as terrorist 
by the US in 2002 (Millward 2004). 
Roberts (2015) contends that the Chinese state has labeled virtually all 
forms of dissent among Uyghurs as “terrorism” and wonders whether the 
anti-terrorism policies of the PRC since 2001 have actually made Uyghur 
terrorism a self-fulfilling prophecy. Whereas prior to the terrorist events 
on 11 September 2001, activism in Xinjiang had been occasionally associ-
ated with terrorism, after the Twin Tower attacks it was invariably identi-
fied as such (Shichor 2009, 46).
Chinese religious repression of both Muslims and Christians8 hardly 
gets the type of Western media attention as does similar repression of 
Buddhism in Tibet. Yet, human rights groups have documented several 
cases of beatings, detentions, and executions of Uyghurs charged with 
separatist activities. A 2008 US State Department report criticized China’s 
use of regulations restricting Muslims’ religious activity, teaching, and 
places of worship. In September 2015, the Party consolidated its control 
over all religions, issuing for the first time public rules for the United 
Front Work Department, which manages relations with different faiths 
and other sectors of society (UCA News 2015). Party members are now 
prohibited from following a faith because of stipulations that religion 
must be separated from the Chinese state. Authorities have outlawed 
cultural and religious markers including burqas and large beards. Beijing 
maintains it is only targeting a minority of Muslim separatists, labelling 
them “terrorists.” Despite the regime’s different approach to the various 
Muslim ethnic groups, the geographically widening designation of Islam 
as a security issue or as “political Islam” strengthens the Chinese govern-
ment’s hand. 
Yet, in view of China’s position as the largest exporter to the Middle 
East, Chinese state policy that is openly repressive on Muslim issues runs 
the risk of being economically and politically counterproductive (Pisca-
tori 2015). The success of China’s plan for a New Silk Road and its wish 
to foster good relations with Muslim states depends to a large extent on 
its handling of domestic Muslim issues (Dillon 1994, Gladney 2003, Zheng 
2011). Therefore, China is careful to maintain the semantic separation 
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between the faith (“Islam”) and those who engage in terrorist acts. As a 
study of the editorials and commentaries in some official Chinese news-
paper stories about the Charlie Hebdo attacks reveals, terrorism is viewed 
as different from Islam, which as a religion is reported to have peace as 
its core value (Lupano 2015). The Chinese leadership also recognizes the 
benefits to be gained from not openly cracking down too severely on re-
ligious practices, not only to gain goodwill from Islamic countries in the 
Middle East for the sake of international trade and diplomacy, but also 
to safeguard the national dependence on the valuable natural resources 
of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Moreover, when religious 
activity is condoned it allows the government to monitor these religious 
groups in the interest of preserving national security and national unity 
(Shorey 2013).
Research of Chinese Official Press Representation  
of Muslims in China
A mixed picture emerges from the literature on press representation of 
Muslims in China. One quantitative study of a selection of 40 (unspeci-
fied) Chinese newspapers over a period from July 5, 2009, to October 12, 
2012, concludes that Chinese Muslims receive more positive coverage in 
view of the articles’ focus on cultural festivals, dietary restrictions, mod-
est dress, and annual pilgrimage to Mecca (Alkazemi 2015). However, the 
search terms in Alkazemi’s study included “Hui minority,” which may 
have yielded a corpus with a focus on the Hui Muslims. As was clarified 
above, this group has a less contentious relationship with the Han au-
thorities than the Uyghur Muslims. On Chinese state media websites, the 
Communist Party engages in a discursive online competition with the Uy-
ghur diaspora narratives on Uyghur people and their homeland Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region (Culpepper 2012).9 The English-language 
website “True Xinjiang,” maintained by editors and correspondents from 
the Global Times, an international affairs publication produced by the CCP 
official newspaper People’s Renminribao, shows the newspaper’s feeling 
about the “untruths” given by the Uyghur diaspora. According to Cul-
pepper, Uyghur diaspora representations of religion focus on Chinese 
government policies of religious repression and refrain from suggesting an 
inextricably linked Muslim-Uyghur identity. The Uyghur American As-
sociation has asked media outlets to avoid labeling Uyghurs as “Chinese 
Muslims,” given their Central Asian-Turkic heritage and the presence of 
Uyghur Christians (2012, 194). 10 As Culpepper notes, the Uyghur diaspora 
online community is particularly upset by restrictions on the building of 
mosques and private religious schools and are equally offended by the 
bans on government officials, state employees, and Communist Party 
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members from entering mosques, which prevent practicing Muslims from 
participating in the Chinese party-state apparatus. In representations of 
Uyghur culture, the Chinese government pays scant attention to the Uy-
ghur’s Central Asian-Turkic features. Instead, it focuses on those cultural 
characteristics which lend themselves to tourism, such as Uyghur foods 
and traditional Muslim festivals (Culpepper 2012, 194). This supports Dru 
Gladney’s research on the government’s policy of representing the “color-
ful” minorities in China as commodities (Gladney 1994b). 
It has also been argued that the prime state newspapers (Renminribao, 
China Daily) in addition to local papers, such as Xinjiang Daily, Xinjiang 
Metropolis Daily, disregard complexity in their front-page representation 
of the Minkaohan, an Uyghur subgroup in the period 2002–2010 (Zheng 
2011). An important change in Uyghur representation after 9/11 was 
identified, corresponding with an increase in negative depictions linking 
the group to terrorism and as a greater threat to China (2011, iii). Zheng 
also noted the supposed insignificance of Uyghurs on the state media 
agenda, given the low number of articles on the front pages. In times 
of crisis (July–September 2008), the English-language paper, targeting 
international readers, published more articles than its Chinese-language 
sister paper. The local Xinjiang papers, catering to Uyghurs, had scarce 
coverage of the group, except in 2009, when the July riots swept the 
region. Leader-in-exile Rebiya Kadeer and the World Uyghur Congress 
were depicted as the culprits. The state media highlighted the ethnic riots, 
promoted ethnic unity and social stability, and proposed a fight against 
terrorism as a remedy. 
Interestingly, the English-language China Daily, catering to an interna-
tional audience, was found to devote 49% of its articles to the issue of ter-
rorism when covering Uyghurs, while the Chinese-language RMRB had 
none. Since 9/11 and after the US State Department put ETIM on its list 
of terrorist groups, Uyghurs have been cast in the light of terrorism quite 
consistently in the China Daily (Zheng 2011). Because of some Uyghur 
engagement in terrorist activities and involvement in Al-Qaeda, China 
has jumped on the bandwagon of the US “war on terrorism.” The terror-
ism and economic development frames were found to permeate Uyghur 
coverage in ordinary years, while crime, ethnic unity, and social stability 
frames dominate in times of crisis. As Zheng argues, the fighting terror-
ism frame may be used as “an excuse to justify its [the government’s] 
crackdown on Uyghurs in Xinjiang, while hyping economic development 
to buttress its assumption that Xinjiang is still economically backward 
and in need of help from Beijing” (Zheng 2011, 116). Frames such as 
religion, cultural activities, and poverty were not identified. Instead, Uy-
ghurs are said to be increasingly represented as a threat to China’s stabil-
ity, security, and national integrity.
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Besides the Chinese traditional state media, mainstream network me-
dia coverage of religious and ethnic news have also been analyzed. Bai 
and Zhen (2014) checked network media, such as People and Xinhua Net, 
from 2009 to 2013. Results indicate that religious reports concentrate more 
on the political category, the main type of which is the organization of 
religious meetings (66% of 40 articles in People, and 53% of 94 articles in 
Xinhua Net) (2014, 28). As the religious culture is covered through a po-
litical lens, the coverage is limited. Similarly, the minority news articles 
are politically coated: political news, including meetings, political learn-
ing, leadership attending activities, is the dominant category (55.5% of 
60 articles for People and 48.6% of 183 articles for Xinhua Net), relegating 
cultural news (including introduction of religious history and cultural 
traditions) and educational news to second and third place. This tallies 
with the thematic hierarchies indicated by Zheng (2011). As issues of mi-
norities and religion are part of the minefield of political ideology, Bai and 
Zhen (2014) found the religious discourse to be clad in vague language. 
Expressions focusing on national unity, social stability, harmony, and 
common prosperity of all ethnic groups are viewed as symptomatic of a 
political propaganda mode. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: PORTRAYAL OF UYGHUR MUSLIMS IN 
THE RENMINRIBAO NARRATIVES OF 2008 AND 2009
The following paragraphs detail the results of the content analysis with 
quantitative data in terms of frequency counts. This survey is followed by 
a description of the frames retrieved from the narratives. 
Content Analysis
The first section sheds light on the journalistic attention to Islam in the 
articles about the Uyghur, on genre, news locations, and news occasions. 
This is followed by a survey of themes and subthemes, religious dimen-
sions, types of actors and their ethnic and religious backgrounds, as well 
as on the origin of the articles.
Salience, Genres, News Locations, and News Occasions
As concerns prominence of the terms “Islam” (回教—Huíjiào—or 伊斯
兰教—Yīsīlánjiào) or “Uyghurs” in the headlines or subtitles, only 12 of 
60 articles (20%) make an explicit reference to one of these two notions in 
the (sub) title. The vast majority of these (sub) headlines refer to the Uy-
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ghurs (10 articles), while only two mention Islam. One reason is the meth-
odological selection of the keyword search string 维吾尔族 weiwuerzu 
(Uyghurs), which did not include the terms for Islam, as the focus of the 
research was on the portrayal of the Uyghur Muslim actor. Yet, this find-
ing indicates that the religious dimension does not prevail in headlines 
referring to the Uyghur population.
The corpus of 60 articles consists of commentaries about current af-
fairs (50%), hero stories commending people for their good performance 
(13.3%), news reports (13.3%), human interest stories (13.3%), editori-
als (8.3%), interviews (6.7%), feature stories (6.7%), letters to the editor 
(1.7%), and statistics reports (1.7%). The large number of commentaries 
or shiping 时评 is not peculiar, as this genre typifies the Chinese press 
(Zhao 2012). Also typical for the communist press is the genre in which 
narratives of heroic deeds are told in the style of Lei Feng, the selfless PLA 
soldier, who in a 1963 nationwide campaign became the epitome of the 
modest soldier devoted to the communist cause. This type of propaganda 
takes precedence over the pure news reports, which are remarkably few 
in number, especially at a time of great unrest in Xinjiang after the ethnic 
riots on July 5, 2009. 
As for news locations, 97 areas are covered, 74 of which are located in 
China. Not unexpectedly, the Uyghur capital, Urumqi, is the most promi-
nent place, being covered 30 times (40.5% of the domestic coverage), 
followed by the region Xinjiang (17 times or 17.3%). The discrepancy in 
attention between the urban area and the rural periphery echoes the find-
ings by Zheng (2011). Among the 23 foreign news locations, categorized 
in six foreign nations (US, Pakistan, Canada, Germany, Spain, and South 
Korea), the US ranks first with eight references (34.8% of the foreign news 
locations) because it hosts a large number of overseas Chinese, not to 
mention the exiled Uyghur leader, Rebiya Kadeer. Pakistan, which as a 
neighbor and close ally of China is an important trade hub, ranks second 
with four mentions (17.4% of the foreign news locations). 
The news locations are, as can be expected, related to the news being 
reported. In total, 18 events were identified, 16 of which occurred only 
once. Thirty-one articles (51.7%) are related to the July 5 ethnic riots be-
tween Uyghurs and Han Chinese in Urumqi, which resulted in hundreds 
of casualties. Twelve articles (20%) do not discuss a news event. They 
merely discuss matters of human interest or consist of hero stories. All 
news occasions were classified as negative, positive, or neutral. Thirty-
two articles report on negative events, as could be expected, given that 31 
articles are related to the riots. Ten reports deal with positive occasions 
and 18 articles were categorized as neutral, which can partly be explained 
by the fact that 12 articles have no direct news occasion.11 
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(Sub) themes, Religious Dimensions, Ethnic/Religious Background  
of News Actors and Authors
Themes and religious dimensions  While mapping the newsworthi-
ness of events, the following categories were registered: (domestic) 
politics, crime, human interest, social welfare and education, culture, for-
eign news, agriculture. Nowhere does the theme of Uyghur nationalism 
emerge. Politics is the prevalent theme (31.7%). Other recurrent themes 
are criminality (23.3%), human interest topics (16.7%), and social welfare 
or education (15%). Subthemes linked with economy, like poverty and 
development, are frequently reported, but mostly used in a socio-cultural 
sense.
Only 19 texts (31.7%) contain religious dimensions. The following 14 
dimensions cumulatively generated 48 markings: Islam (2x), peaceful 
attitude of Islam (2x), Koran (4x), halal food (3x), Islamic slogans (2x), 
Islamic holidays (3x), Islamic republic (1x), Islamic clergy (5x), Islamic 
institutions (8x), mosque (6x), Muslims (2x), religious extremism (4x), 
religious freedom (3x), and religious policies (3x). Most of these terms 
relate explicitly or implicitly to Islam. The latter three noun phrases (re-
ligious extremism, religious freedom, and religious policies) are used in 
the context of Islam and are politically coated. If we view the “Islamic 
institutions” and “the Islamic republic” as political categories, nearly half 
of the 48 references to religion carry a political ring, which would support 
Bai and Zhen’s (2014) argument about the primary focus on the political 
aspect of religion. Most articles only include one reference to religion, but 
one text registers nine. In a couple of reports, imams relate eyewitness sto-
ries of the events on July 5 at the White mosque of Urumqi. Islam is said 
to disapprove of the use of violence12 and to be a peaceful religion. None 
of the mosque’s employees were reportedly involved in the violence.13 
Spokespeople of predominantly Muslim countries, such as Syria, Turkey, 
Indonesia, Morocco are said to approve of the Chinese government’s 
handling of the “incidents” and claim that China guarantees religious 
freedoms but also urge China to clamp down on religious extremism.14 
Hence, legitimation of state action is achieved by seeking support from 
external Muslim leaders.
As most of the texts mentioning Uyghurs do not include a religious 
dimension, the primary focus in the corpus is not on religion, but on 
ethnic riots. Therefore, it is not surprising that the narratives widely re-
port on vandalism, organized crime, separatism, terrorism, and religious 
extremism. Most importantly, no causal links are made between Uyghurs 
and terrorism. In addition, it is explicitly stated that religion is not the 
problem. The culprits are separatists who destroy the unity of the Minzu 
(nationalities) and who are influenced by evil forces from abroad, such 
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as the World Uyghur Congress and its leader, Rebiya Kadeer. It is often 
repeated that the majority of the Uyghurs are not separatists. Not unlike 
the Chinese discursive strategy of reducing the separatist threat from Tai-
wan to a small proportion of the Taiwanese people (Lams 2014), are the 
Uyghur separatists reduced to a minority. 
As concerns subthemes which occur four times or more across the cor-
pus, religion only features as religious extremism, and appears in a mere 
6.7% of the articles. More important subthemes are development (50%), 
separatism (48.3%), terrorism (40%), ethnic violence (20%), and unity of 
Minzu (20%). Poverty is a subtheme in only 16.7% of the corpus, followed 
by education (11.7%). The themes of citizens helping each other and the 
role of the People’s Liberation Army in extending help and bringing sta-
bility both register 6.7% of the articles. This thematic line-up corresponds 
with the findings by Zheng (2011) about the RMRB front-page articles 
themes. The focus on government aid to the development of minority 
areas and the unity between the Minzu is clad in a heavy propaganda 
discourse mode, positioning the Self in a positive mode. The minority 
cultures are depicted as suffering from slow economic growth and being 
most eager to accept help from a benevolent government.
Types of news actors  For the analysis of actors, the team project’s 
variables of gender and collectivity were retained and ethnic back-
ground was added. Results are as follows: out of 699 actors, 475 are 
individuals (68%). Among the coded collectives (224 or 32%), which 
cannot be divided by gender, we note organizations, countries, govern-
ment bodies, ethnic, and other groups. Of the individuals, male actors 
are dominant with 79.7% versus 20.3% of female actors. For 448 actors 
(64.1%), ethnic background is not mentioned. This is the case for the col-
lectives, like Xinjiang, the army, people of all nationalities (40.2%) and 
the individuals who remain unspecified (59.8%). Of the 251 ethnically 
specified actors, the Uyghurs and the Han feature most prominently 
with 55.7% and 18.7% respectively. The “other” category, consisting 
of all non-Han (both Chinese and foreigners) accounts for 25.6% of the 
specified actors.15 
The religious background of almost none of these actors is explicitly 
mentioned. Only three out of 699 actors are identified as imams. Yet, 
specified actors belonging to an ethnic group considered Muslim by the 
Chinese government were coded as Muslim actors. A similar rationale 
held for those actors with the nationality of a country that has a mainly 
Islamic population as well as for the predominantly Muslim countries 
that are actors in this corpus. This resulted in a coding of 180 actors (25.8% 
of all news actors or 71.7% of all specified actors) as Muslim actors. How-
ever, given the large category of “ethnically unspecified” actors (64.1%), it 
is difficult to give an accurate picture for the actors’ religious background. 
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What is meaningful, however, is the little explicit attention given to the 
religious component of the actors’ identity.
As for the background of the articles’ authors, one third of the source is 
not specified, as very often there is either no attribution or a vague refer-
ence to, for example, a “journalist of the Xinhua news agency” (the official 
Chinese news agency). In 40 articles, a source is given but ethnic back-
ground is not mentioned.16 It is difficult to derive ethnicity from names. 
Although one can easily distinguish Uyghur names from Han Chinese 
names, it is not easy to distinguish Han Chinese names from Manchu 
or Hui names or to distinguish Uyghur names from Kazakh names. We 
can only conclude that none of the names mentioned in the corpus was 
Turkic, which points at an underrepresentation of the Uyghur’s voice in 
the text production process.
Framing Analysis
As for Islam, only two instances of the frame “Islam as a peaceful re-
ligion”17 and one occurrence of the frame “China respecting religious 
freedom” were found. The former frame presents a positive perspective 
about Islam and the latter renders a sanitized picture about the state of 
religious freedom in China. Of the eight frames about Uyghurs, implicitly 
generated through references to people of minorities or people of Xinji-
ang in general (including Uyghurs), three have a negative ring (“lack of 
gratitude to state,” “need for propaganda work with Xinjiang minorities,” 
“use of minority culture as pretext for separatism”) and five carry a more 
positive message (“minority people are outstanding personnel”; “major-
ity of Uyghurs are anti-separatist”; “Xinjiang citizens are models”; “Xinji-
ang people are successful”; and “united nationalities build a harmonious 
society.” These mixed images result in a nuanced picture of Uyghurs. 
The same result emerges from an examination of how actors are syntac-
tically positioned in an active/passive role in combination with the con-
notation of the action with which they are associated. Subjects, associated 
with positive actions and whose ethnic background is specified, are most 
often, but not exclusively, Uyghurs. Conversely, when the active actors 
whose ethnic background is made explicit are associated with negative 
actions, they are all Uyghurs. Some of the model citizens in the articles 
are Uyghurs, but famous Uyghurs like the leader-in-exile, Rebiya Kadeer, 
are demonized.
The prominent frames are, in ranking order of frequency: national 
unity equals harmony (9x); poor Xinjiang in need of aid (8x); Rebiya Ka-
deer as a terrorist villain (responsibility frame) (8x); anti-separatist major-
ity (8x); morality frame in terms of self-sacrifice and model citizens (7x); 
morality frame in terms of moral duty for gratitude to government (5x); 
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government as benefactor (4x); Chinese army as enforcer of stability (4x); 
the more prosperous future (3x); army-loving citizens (3x). 
The “united nationalities equals harmony” frame can be illustrated 
with the following attributions of positive qualifications to the Minzu 
“living together like brothers,” mentioned in a quote by a victim of the 
July 5 riots: “Of course, the mobsters wounded our flesh, but they did not 
succeed to wound our hearts. The way we live together is like brothers.”18 
The anti-separatist majority frame finds its expression in the following 
propaganda lines:
“Strengthen ethnic unity, oppose ethnic separatism, guard the unity of the 
motherland.” Reporters viewed this slogan on a community wall near the 
neighbourhood community centre. Locals explained it was written by Uy-
ghur residents. It also represents the aspirations of the people of all Minzu 
of the entire country.19 
It is precisely in times of unrest that the preaching mode takes over, 
implying that ethnic unity is not a reality yet. The “government as bene-
factor” frame and the good news about the government’s role in the de-
velopment of Xinjiang is evident in the following excerpt:
The enormous successes the economy of Xinjiang has achieved are a result of 
the battle to unify the Minzu by the people of Xinjiang, but are also the result 
of the long-term support granted by the central government and the people 
of the entire country.20 
The responsibility frame (“Rebiya Kadeer is a terrorist-villain”) blames 
the July 5 riots on Rebiya Kadeer, the Uyghur leader-in-exile and head of 
the Uyghur World Congress, an organization that is vilified in Chinese of-
ficial discourse. In the article, headlined “Unveiling the most evil,” Kadeer 
is labelled a “second Dalai Lama who speaks ill of China.” The negative 
predicates cumulatively build the frame of Kadeer as the evil culprit as 
follows:
The violent, serious and criminal events in Urumqi were organised and 
premeditated. The foreign “Uyghur World Congress”—that is headed by Re-
biya Kadeer—and other organisations are the dark force behind the violent 
incidents as they directly incited, planned and executed it.21 
Not only is the culprit of the unrest sought outside of Xinjiang, any 
possible ethnic and religious aspect is also explicitly denied. The violence 
of the riots is described in terms of their criminal staging and organiza-
tion by hostile forces and separatists, but there is no explicit link between 
Uyghurs and terrorism, except for diatribes about the World Uyghur 
Congress, which operates from abroad. 
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CONCLUSION
Our study was conducted on state narratives of 2008–2009 under the Hu 
Jintao presidency, before the more recently strengthened Party control 
over religions in the present Xi Jinping era.22 The years 2008 and 2009 
were chosen, as these were the very years where China and Uyghur eth-
nic conflicts garnered world attention because of the Olympics and the 
2009 Urumqi ethnic riots between Uyghurs and Han Chinese. Research 
on Chinese press coverage of the Hui Muslim by Alkazemi (2015) re-
vealed a positive portrayal, which is not surprising, given the higher de-
gree of cultural and political integration of the Hui into Chinese society. 
This begged the question how the prime state newspaper would portray 
the other Muslim group, the Uyghurs, which is viewed by the authori-
ties as more politically troublesome. Would they stigmatize this Muslim 
Other in a similar Orientalist way as was suggested in the literature on 
some Western press coverage of Islam?
Clearly, the global “war on terror” has emboldened Beijing to tighten 
its grip on a dissenting Xinjiang and thus reduce the region’s autonomy. 
The Uyghur population is regarded by the authorities as a threat to state 
rule, national unity, and social integration, which can be derived from the 
implicit message underlying the many propaganda appeals for national 
unity and harmony in the Chinese-language Renminribao. This focus on 
national unity, supports findings by Bai and Zhen (2014) concerning the 
propaganda discourse mode in the official press narratives. It emerges 
through the arguments emphasizing the need for continued aid to mi-
nority areas by a benevolent government and for military presence to 
safeguard stability and strengthen national unity. Also emblematic for the 
communist propaganda style is the genre in which narratives of heroic 
deeds and model citizens or soldiers are told. Praise is heaped upon the 
government and security forces for their love of the people, including the 
minorities.
The relative salience of themes, gender distribution, as well as the 
discrepancy in attention between the urban area and the rural periph-
ery echo the results of Zheng’s study (2011) about the RMRB frontpage 
coverage of the Uyghurs. Together with Zheng, we conclude that the 
Uyghur majority living in the rural southwest of Xinjiang is not deemed 
newsworthy enough for coverage, nor do Uyghur journalists appear to 
author the narratives of the official press. Of the individuals, male actors 
are the overwhelmingly dominant category with 79.7% versus 20.3% of 
female actors.
At the explicit level, the narratives construct a more or less balanced pic-
ture of the Uyghurs, with both positive and negative attributes. There is 
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no mention of Uyghur ethnic nationalism and the majority of the Uyghurs 
is framed as anti-separatist. The religious dimension is downplayed and 
in the rare occasions where Islam is discussed, it is portrayed in a posi-
tive way as a peace-loving religion, thus being explicitly dissociated from 
terrorism. This echoes the Chinese official position that denies any link 
between local discontent and ethnic/religious policies. It also confirms 
the observations made by Lupano (2015). When drawing the attention 
to the Uyghur group in the headlines, the religious dimension is virtu-
ally absent, which also supports the findings by Bai and Zhen (2014) and 
Zheng (2011). Strikingly few articles contain a religious dimension. Not 
surprising for a major state newspaper, politics make up the top theme. 
Second in rank are narratives on crime, followed by human interest sto-
ries. Since most articles relate to the 2009 July 5 ethnic riots, the focus lies 
on vandalism, organized crime, and the three forces (sangu shili), being 
separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism. However, it is explicitly 
argued that the cause of terrorism is not religion. This points at a different 
frame in the Chinese official media narratives from the one constructed 
in some Western media organizations when dealing with Islamic forces. 
The combination of positive and negative portrayals of Uyghur Muslims 
does run parallel to the more nuanced discursive representations of Islam 
and Muslims in the particular niche of the British Christian news media 
(Faimau 2013). 
The blame for terrorism consistently goes to the foreign Other, like the 
Uyghur leader-in-exile. This well-considered editorial strategy is not sur-
prising in view of the Chinese authoritarian media system, where media 
constitute an ideological instrument for the Party to steer public opinion 
in the “right” way. The careful attribution of blame and responsibility, 
not so much to the domestic Uyghurs, but to outsiders, is partly mirrored 
in the finding by Zheng (2011) about the differentiation between the 
English-language press and the Chinese-language press, both catering 
to different audiences. In the front-page articles of the English-language 
daily, Uyghurs are more explicitly framed in the light of terrorism and 
radicalization, while this portrayal is absent in the Chinese-language 
paper’s headlines. Clearly, the “fighting terrorism frame” is more heavily 
promoted to a foreign readership, as the terrorist threat and the result-
ing Chinese jump on the bandwagon of the global war on terror can 
legitimize its crackdown on Uyghurs. On November 15, 2015, just after 
the terrorist attacks in Paris, Wang Yi, PRC Foreign Minister, repeated in 
a speech in Istanbul that “China is also a victim of terrorism and cracking 
down on ETIM should become an important part of the international fight 
against terrorism.” The dual discourse mode with diverging messages 
between the vernacular and the foreign language press renders a fuzzy 
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picture about the Chinese representation practices of the Uyghur Mus-
lims. Additionally, what exacerbates the daunting task of drawing ready 
conclusions is the seemingly contradictory message between discourse 
and practice, when it concerns China and religion.
NOTES
 1. The study was conducted by a study team of the Media Diversity Institute 
of Cardiff University, in partnership with ARTICLE 19 and the International Fed-
eration of Journalists.
 2. Much gratitude goes to my student, Renée Dekker, who coded the Chinese 
corpus. The author trained the coder in media discourse analysis for this book 
project on Islam representation in the press and supervised her master thesis on 
the topic, which provided many of the raw data for the empirical analysis in the 
third part of this chapter. 
 3. This theory relates to how media can influence the salience of topics on the 
public agenda.  
 4. In seven news articles, a shortened version of the Chinese word for “Uy-
ghur” was used for stylistic diversification (维族 or weizu).
 5. For general background on Islamic groups in China and the Uyghur-China 
conflict, see, among others, Bovingdon 2004, 2010; Castets 2006; Christofferson 
2007; Dillon 1994, 1996, 2002, 2004, 2013; Doyon 2014; Dubois 2010; Grose 2015; 
Smith Finley 2007, 2013; Gladney 1996, 2003, 2004a, 2004b; Israeli 1980; Lipman 
1997; Ma 2015; Millward 2004; Shorey 2013; Starr 2004, 2015; Van Wie Davis and 
Azizian 2007; Yang 2012.
 6. The pre-PRC Chinese characters for Islam were 回教 (Huíjiào), literally “the 
religion of the Hui.” Since the establishment of the PRC, the standard term for 
“Islam” on mainland China has become the transliteration 伊斯兰教 (Yīsīlán jiào, 
literally “Islam religion”) (Gladney 1996, 18–19; 2004a, 161–62). In its 1949 recon-
struction of the Hui people as an ethnic group or Minzu, the Communist Party 
thus separated ethnicity from religion.
 7. It must be acknowledged that to this generalized picture there are excep-
tions, in that some Uyghurs are well integrated into Chinese society and some Hui 
resist integration into Chinese culture.
 8. Since 2014, there has been a step-up of local authority campaigns against 
Christian places of worship, especially in Zhejiang (destruction of churches, re-
moval of crosses) (see “Christelijk verzet,” 2015; original source European Demo-
lition Association, August 26, 2015).
 9. The selection of papers for the study by Culpepper did not include the of-
ficial newspaper Renminribao, which is the unit of analysis in the current chapter. 
The reporting between the Chinese and English websites was found to be consis-
tent.
10. UAA (Uyghur American Association), “Media Advisory: Concern over 
the Use of the Inaccurate Term Chinese Muslim to Refer to Uyghurs,” http://
docs.uyghuramerican.org/Media%20advisory-Chinese%20vs%20Uyghur.pdf (in 
Culpepper 2012, 194).
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11. Here is a selection of news occasions: remembering the death of a party 
cadre, 63-year jubilee of the 6th minorities division PLA, Xinjiang Trade Asso-
ciation visits Pakistan, Olympic Games, finishing of 27th minorities education 
month, selection of candidates for national benefactors award, 60-year anniver-
sary of PLA presence in Xinjiang, diplomatic envoys visit Xinjiang, Uyghur peas-
ant meeting with Premier Wen Jiabao, acrobatics show for 60th anniversary PRC, 
publication of statistics report, tour conclusion of the National Propaganda Group 
(Dekker 2014).
12. RMRB, 不许玷污清真寺 (Do not defile the mosque), July 2009, anonymous 
author.
13. RMRB, 晨曦中，国旗照常升起 (In the morning the flag is being hoisted as 
usual), July 28, 2009, Wang Huimin, Dai Gang, Liu Weitao, Ceng Huafeng, Gong 
Shijian.
14. RMRB, 把所见所闻告诉全世界 (Tell the entire world what you see and 
hear), August 15, 2009, Li Zhihui, Zhu Xiaolong, and Yu Zhongwen.
15. The non-Han categories consist of foreigners with 4.4% (out of total of 699 
actors), Kazakh (1.3%), Hui (1%), Tibetan (0.7%), Non-Han unspecified (0.7%), 
Mongol (0.6%), Tajik (0.4%), Kirghiz (0.1%), Xibe (0.1%), Mixed Han-Uyghur 
(0.1%), Naxi (0.1%).
16. By chance, two articles beyond corpus (e.g., September 20, 2010 or June 6, 
2010) were found with an ethnic specification of the authors, both of them non-
Han Chinese. Further research needs to be conducted to see if it is customary to 
mention an author’s non-Han ethnicity.
17. RMRB, 不许玷污清真寺 (Do not defile the mosque), July 27, 2009, anony-
mous. The statement that Islam disapproves of the use of violence is uttered by 
an imam; RMRB, 晨曦中，国旗照常升起 (In the morning the flag is being hoisted 
as usual), July 28, 2009, Wang et al. In this article, the authors recount how, during 
the riot, fifteen people were saved from the violence in the streets because they 
were allowed into the mosque. It is reiterated that Islam is a peaceful religion. 
None of the mosque’s employees were reportedly involved in the violence.
18. RMRB, 病房里的民族情 (Minzu feelings of a hospital ward), June 8, 2009, 
Shi Shaodong and Wang Yunfeng.
19. RMRB, 摧不垮的钢铁长城 (Indestructible Chinese wall), July 21, 2009, 
anonymous.
20. RMRB, 新疆的发展与进步 (Xinjiang’s development and progress), Septem-
ber 22, 2009, anonymous.
21. RMRB, 画皮下的罪恶 (Unveiling the most evil), July 8, 2009, anonymous.
22. Given the policy measures and state actions against Muslim and Christian 
actors under President Xi Jinping, a follow-up study on the latest articles in the 
Chinese state press about Islam and Islamic and other religious actors in China 
would be illuminating to see whether there is a growing discrepancy between 
discourse and reality. For example, according to an article in the Chinese state-run 
newspaper, The Global Times, published on February 9, 2015, government policy 
toward the underground Christian church is reported to have been relaxed, but 
recent actions against church demolitions point to the contrary (see Verbiest Ko-
erier, October 2015, 12–13).

